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CITIZENSHIP DENIED: IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
NATURALIZATION BACKLOG FOR NONCITIZENS IN THE 
MILITARY 
BY MING H. CHEN† 
ABSTRACT 
The immigration system is in crisis. Long lines of asylum seekers at 
the border and immigrants in the interior spend years waiting for their 
day in immigration court. This is true in the agencies that process appli-
cations for immigration benefits from legal immigrants as well. Since 
2016, delays in naturalization have increased to historic proportions. The 
problem is even worse for military naturalizations, where delays are ac-
companied by denials and overall declines in military naturalizations. It 
is the latest front in the battle on legal migration and citizenship. 
These impediments to citizenship demonstrate an extreme form of 
policies collectively dubbed the “second wall.” These policies are ani-
mated by mistrust of foreigners and immigrant restrictionism, bureau-
cratic bungling and institutional neglect for service members, and overre-
liance on national security justifications. These changes affront civil and 
voting rights for immigrants, diminish military enlistment, and under-
mine the institutions of citizenship and democracy. This Article docu-
ments barriers to citizenship. More specifically, it analyzes the causes 
and consequences of citizenship denials in general and military naturali-
zation. It offers solutions that bolster immigrants, the military, and the 
meaning of citizenship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, hundreds of thousands of people apply for citizenship in 
the United States. Their pursuit of citizenship is premised on a right to 
naturalize created by the Constitution1 and codified by federal law.2 The 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) is the agency within 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that processes immi-
gration benefits, including naturalization applications.3 Processing times 
that exceed the six-month timeline compromise these individuals’ path to 
naturalization and the other rights that citizenship provides. Yet the time-
ly processing of naturalization applications has proved elusive. 
In advance of Citizenship Day (September 2019), the Colorado 
State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights re-
leased a report on the civil rights implications of the USCIS’s naturaliza-
  
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization”); see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing for birthright citizenship). 
 2. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2018). 
 3. 8 C.F.R. § 310.2 (2020). 
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tion backlog in Colorado. In its report, it finds that the USCIS’s “national 
backlog in naturalization applications is 738,148 and the [USCIS’s] na-
tional average wait times range from [ten] months to nearly three years.”4 
The national figures show a predictable increase in applications that con-
tributed to the backlogs that occurred leading up to national elections. 
These backlogs remained high in many places.5 In Colorado, the USCIS 
“Denver Field Office backlog in naturalization applications is 9,325 and 
wait times range from 10 to 19.5 months.”6 The backlog persists in the 
USCIS Denver Field Office “despite the number of applications received 
by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service returning to pre-
election levels and [an] increase[ ] made to staffing and . . . other . . . 
resources[.]”7 These figures improved slightly as the fiscal year 2019 
wrapped up—the wait time was seven months to thirteen months in Col-
orado—but given the expected increase in applications leading up to the 
presidential election the backlog is unlikely to be resolved and may 
worsen. 
A secondary finding in the report is that the delays are particularly 
pronounced for noncitizens in the military.8 Despite Congress’s intent for 
military service members to gain quick and easy access to citizenship, 
veterans and service members are worse off than civilians.9 Service 
members face longer wait times, and many applications stall during U.S. 
Department of Defense background checks before they can be adjudicat-
ed on the merits.10 If their applications make it to the USCIS, they face 
increased denials for reasons endemic to their immigrant status and the 
national security context on war.11 Declining applications for military 
naturalization indicate that the application requirements are taking a toll: 
they have become so burdensome that they function as impassible barri-
ers to citizenship.12 This Article highlights the troubling state of military 
naturalization as a case study of the attack on legal migration and citizen-
ship. It describes the scope of the problem, building on Citizenship De-
layed and related reports in Part I.13 It extends these reports by analyzing 
the causes and consequences of the impediments to the naturalization 
  
 4. COLO. STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP 
DELAYED: CIVIL RIGHTS AND VOTING RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE BACKLOG IN CITIZENSHIP AND 
NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS 5 (2019) [hereinafter CITIZENSHIP DELAYED]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally Zachary R. New, Ending Citizenship for Service in the Forever Wars, 129 
YALE L.J. FORUM 552, 554–61 (2020) (describing the history of “citizenship for service” and recent-
ly enacted policies that are creating obstacles to and “effectively ending, this centuries-old pathway 
to citizenship”). 
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backlog in Parts II and III. The Article concludes with policy solutions in 
Part IV. 
I. THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS 
A. Naturalization Generally 
There are two paths to citizenship: birthright citizenship or natural-
ized citizenship.14 Those who naturalize typically become eligible 
through a family member or employer, though in some cases noncitizens 
become eligible through service to the military.15 
The requirements for naturalization are detailed in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA).16 First, an applicant must have legal perma-
nent resident (LPR) status.17 In most cases, applicants must also demon-
strate that they have five years of continuous residence in the United 
States; that they are at least 18 years of age at the time of filing; that they 
have a basic understanding of U.S. history and government; that they 
have maintained good moral character; and that they demonstrate the 
ability to read, write, and speak English at a basic level.18 
The USCIS is the agency within the DHS that processes immigra-
tion benefits, including naturalization applications. The U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Service was formed after the September 11, 2001, at-
tacks and the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which re-
organized the Immigration and Naturalization Service into three compo-
nents within the DHS.19 On March 1, 2003, the USCIS “assumed respon-
sibility for the immigration service functions of the federal govern-
ment[,]” including the processing of naturalization applications and other 
immigration benefits.20 USCIS field offices conduct interviews and pro-
vide other applicant services related to processing these benefits, a task 
known as agency adjudication.21 
In addition, Congress has established special provisions that apply 
to immigrants who obtain LPR status through military service. INA § 
  
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”); see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have power . . . To establish a uniform 
Rule of Naturalization . . . . ”); 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2018) (providing requirements for naturalization). 
 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1439. 
 16. Id. § 1427. 
 17. Id. § 1427(a); see generally id. § 1101(a)(20) (defining LPR status for purposes of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 18. Id. § 1423(a)(1)–(2) (understanding of English and history); id. § 1427(a), (c)–(d) (resi-
dence, physical presence, good moral character); id. § 1445(b) (age). 
 19. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296 § 451, 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2018); 
see also Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-
history (last updated Jan. 8, 2020). 
 20. Our History, supra note 19. 
 21. See Field Offices, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/find-uscis-office/field-offices (last updated Apr. 30, 2020). 
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328 and INA § 329 establish the modern requirements for military natu-
ralization.22 INA § 328, often referred to as the “peacetime military natu-
ralization statute,” permits applicants who are LPRs and who have 
served in the armed forces for at least one year in aggregate, or have 
been discharged honorably, to naturalize without establishing the five 
years of continuous residence typically required.23 This provision en-
compasses Reservists and National Guard members who may not have 
served in an active-duty capacity.24 INA § 329, the so-called “wartime” 
statute, provides an accelerated naturalization process for individuals 
who serve during wartime, as early as the completion of basic training, 
and it waives physical presence and continuous residence requirements.25 
The wartime statute applies only to applicants who have “served honora-
bly as a member of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or in an 
“active-duty status in the military, air, or naval forces of the United 
States.”26 The United States has been in a “period of hostility” since the 
“War on Terror” began in earnest nearly two decades ago with the post-
September 11, 2001, conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.27 
Immigrants who serve in the military, whether under the regular 
provisions or Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI), 
have an expedited path to naturalized citizenship. Most noncitizens who 
serve in the military become eligible for LPR status and naturalization 
simultaneously. Typically, these will be LPRs who become eligible to 
adjust status in a short time. INA § 328 and § 329, in combination with 
programs that permit the USCIS to adjudicate military naturalizations 
after basic training, shorten the usual waiting time of nearly a decade to a 
matter of days or weeks. 
From 2008 to 2016, refugees, asylees, and noncitizens with select 
temporary visas or temporary protected status could become citizens 
through the MAVNI program.28 Armed services had previously allowed 
non-LPRs to serve and gain citizenship, though the requirements have 
  
 22. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439, 1440; see MARGARET D. STOCK, IMMIGRATION LAW & THE MILITARY 
37 (2d ed. 2015) (explaining that expedited naturalization procedures for military service have 
existed since the Civil War era, dating back to a July 17, 1862, statute providing expediting naturali-
zation for army service). 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1439(a). 
 24. STOCK, supra note 22, at 44. 
 25. Immigration & Nationality Act § 329(a), (b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a), (b)(2).  
 26. Immigration & Nationality Act § 329(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a).  
 27. See New, supra note 13, at 555 (providing a more extensive history of citizenship for 
service dating back to the Revolutionary War). 
 28. MARGARET D. STOCK, TEN THINGS THAT IMMIGRATION LAWYERS SHOULD KNOW 
ABOUT THE ARMY’S NEW NON-CITIZEN RECRUITING PROGRAM 1–2 (2009); see also Richard Gon-
zales, Mattis: ‘DREAMers’ in the Military Won’t be Deported, NPR (Feb. 8, 2018, 10:23 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/08/584424541/mattis-dreamers-in-the-miliary-
won-t-be-deported (discussing the impact of the MAVNI cancellation on recipients of DACA). 
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not been uniform.29 It was not until 2006 that Congress consolidated all 
enlistment eligibility into one statute for all branches and permitted the 
Secretary of Defense to authorize enlistment of non-LPRs via the nation-
al interest exception in 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2).30 This is the provision that 
authorized the MAVNI program to give the U.S. military access to im-
migrants with vital skills. Through this program, immigrants and 
nonimmigrants would be given a way to enlist in the military, and thus 
be given a pathway to citizenship that would not normally be available to 
them.31 However, the MAVNI program was hindered by background 
checks instituted by President Obama in 2016, and it was indefinitely 
suspended under President Trump in 2019. 
B. Changing Trends in Naturalization 
Target times for naturalization adjudication vary depending on the 
type of case and field office assigned, but six months is considered a 
reasonable time by statute.32 Against this baseline, a backlog is statutori-
ly defined as the “number of pending applications that exceed acceptable 
or target pending levels for each case type.”33 According to this defini-
tion, the USCIS has a long-standing history of backlogs for immigration 
benefits, spanning over multiple administrations, which it formally 
acknowledged in 2005.34 This backlog was eliminated in 2006 when 
Congress imposed a timeline and earmarked funding for this purpose.35 
The backlog has steadily grown since then and spiked leading up to and 
during the Trump Administration.36 
There are a number of explanations for the growing backlog. The 
number of applicants for naturalization, and the rate of processing those 
applications, change with agency procedures and policy developments.37 
At the hearings conducted by the Colorado State Advisory Committee to 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights regarding naturalization backlogs, 
immigration attorneys described these intensified vetting practices, 
which include expanded requests for information and more frequent re-
  
 29. STOCK, supra note 22, at 9–10. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense prohibited 
the Navy and Marine Corps from enlisting non-LPRs by a 1993 U.S. Department of Defense “di-
rective” despite no statute or regulation requiring all enlistees to be LPRs. 
 30. 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2)(A) (2018); STOCK, supra note 22, at 9–10. 
 31. See The MAVNI Program: Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest, 
CITIZENPATH (May 1, 2018), https://citizenpath.com/mavni-program. 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1572 (2018). 
 33. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., BACKLOG ELIMINATION PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 
2006, 3RD QUARTER UPDATE 1 (2006) [hereinafter USCIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION PLAN]. 
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. Id.; News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Announces Elimina-
tion of Naturalization Application Backlog (Sept. 15, 2006) (on file with author); see also USCIS 
BACKLOG ELIMINATION PLAN, supra note 33, at 4 (stating that the N-400 processing time was less 
than six months as of the third quarter of fiscal year 2006). 
 36. CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 11, 19, 32. 
 37. See id. at 11. 
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quests for interviews.38 Additionally, a representative from the USCIS 
stated that the agency regularly projects rising naturalization application 
submissions prior to presidential elections and makes staffing decisions 
based on those projections, but that they underestimated the number of 
applications in 2016.39 The anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies of Presi-
dent Trump will likely sustain the trend of heightened interest in natural-
ization leading up to the 2020 presidential election. 
At a time when applications are surging, the Trump Administration 
has implemented policies that place applications under additional scruti-
ny and screening for fraud or national security concerns. The USCIS has 
acknowledged that additional interview requirements required in the 
“Buy American and Hire American” executive order may further in-
crease the backlog in employer-based naturalization applications.40 Poli-
cies laid out in Presidential Proclamation 9645, the Presidential Procla-
mation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting At-
tempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists and Other Public Safe-
ty Threats,41 have intensified vetting practices.42 According to a DHS 
report to Congress, the staff increase of 143 positions, 136 full-time 
equivalents, and more than $43 million for changes in operations can be 
attributed to the Executive Orders on border security and immigration 
enforcement.43 Additionally, rather than increasing the number of adjudi-
cators in anticipation of increased application receipts, new officers hired 
in field offices have been assigned to Fraud Detection and National Se-
curity positions.44 Despite the various policy changes, the approval rate 
for naturalization applications has remained consistent with the historical 
average of around 84%–85%.45 The consistency of this approval rate 
suggests that the policy changes were unnecessary. There were not large 
numbers of applicants that posed national security risks or submitted 
fraudulent documents, otherwise they would have been detected under 
increased scrutiny and denied.  
Although the policy changes do not, by themselves, cause lower ap-
proval rates, they undoubtedly contribute to increased adjudication times 
and the accumulation of a backlog of applications that, in turn, can im-
  
 38. Id. at 12–13, 27–28. 
 39. Id. at 16, 31–32. 
 40. Letter from L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., to Charles 
E. Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with author). 
 41. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 42. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES RESPONSE TO REPRESENTATIVE GARCIA’S FEBRUARY 12, 2019 LETTER 2 (2019) [herein-
after USCIS RESPONSE LETTER]. 
 43. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES 
IMMIGRATION EXAMINATIONS FEE ACCOUNT: FISCAL YEAR 2018 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 
10 (2018). 
 44. CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 29. 
 45. Id. at 30. 
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pact individuals’ ability to vote in the upcoming election.46 Much like the 
right to vote, the right of eligible persons to naturalize is not subject to 
agency discretion.47 Individuals that meet the eligibility requirements 
have a right to be naturalized within the congressionally defined reason-
able period of 180 days.48 Nevertheless, backlogs that far exceed that six-
month adjudication period have been a consistent problem for the 
USCIS.49 The backlog grew significantly at the beginning of the Trump 
Administration and persisted such that the adjudication time ranged as 
long as twenty months in May 2019.50 That means that those applicants 
who submitted their applications in May 2019 may be prevented from 
voting in November 2020. 
If the USCIS were consistently meeting its statutory timeline, appli-
cants would still be able to submit their naturalization applications in 
April 2020 and expect that they would be citizens in time for the 2020 
presidential election. The Denver Field Office has made progress in re-
ducing the backlog of naturalization applications; the estimated range for 
processing time at the end of 2019 was five and a half to twelve 
months.51 But the average range for the almost ninety field offices across 
the country was roughly seven months and three weeks to almost thirteen 
months and three weeks, a range which remained in excess of the statuto-
ry goal of six months.52 And the backlog may worsen with the 2020 pres-
idential election coming up. 
These problematic naturalization trends grow more worrisome when 
studying the subset of naturalization applications for noncitizens in the 
military. Historically, noncitizens in the military seeking citizenship un-
der the expedited process have enjoyed high rates of naturalization.53 
This trend began changing in 2017.54 The scope of the problem can ini-
tially be seen in the declining overall number of military naturalizations. 
It can be understood with greater clarity in the declines in naturalization, 
  
 46. Id. at 20–21. 
 47. Id. at 23; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (2018) (“The right of a person to become a naturalized 
citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such 
person is married.”) (emphasis added). 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1572. 
 49. CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 9. 
 50. Id. at 10. 
 51. Check Case Processing Times, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ (last visited May 4, 2020). 
 52. See id. (average range is calculated based on the reported ranges of all the offices as of 
Feb. 1, 2020). 
 53. Catherine N. Barry, New Americans in Our Nation’s Military, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 
8, 2013, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2013/11/08/79116/new-americans-in-
our-nations-military/. 
 54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-416, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER HANDLE, IDENTIFY, AND TRACK CASES INVOLVING VETERANS 19 
(2019) [hereinafter GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT REPORT]. 
2020] CITIZENSHIP DENIED 677 
the length of delays, and the increased denials in military naturalization 
applications. 
1. Declines in Military Naturalization 
The transition from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2017 marks an in-
flection point at which the annual number of military naturalization ap-
plications and the overall number of resulting naturalizations drop dra-
matically. This timeframe coincides with the U.S. Department of De-
fense’s announcement on October 13, 2017, that enlistees must complete 
the entire security screening prior to naturalization.55 The timing also 
closely follows the suspension of the MAVNI program in September 
2016.56 
Part of the decline in naturalizations relates to the raw number of 
applications filed. The Government Accountability Office observed that 
“the number of applications received declined sharply from fiscal years 
2017 to 2018,” as illustrated by the following figure.57 
Figure 1. Total Military Naturalization Applications Received. 
 








 55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Policy Changes to Lawful Permanent 
Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program (Oct. 
13, 2017) (on file with author). 
 56. GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 54, at 20. 
 57. Id. at 19. 
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Figure 2. Declining Military Naturalizations. 
 
Source: Quarterly data, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
The decline in applications cannot solely account for decreased nat-
uralizations. And it cannot be attributed to lack of interest. By compari-
son, about 19,800 noncitizens serve in active duty status in various 
branches of the armed forces.58 Likely, it indicates that the 2016 and 
2017 procedural burdens have increased to the level that applications 
cannot be filed, that applicants feel discouraged from pursuing citizen-
ship, or that applications are backlogged in the process leading up to 
approval. 
2. Delays in Military Naturalization 
One way of measuring that backlog is to consider wait times. Re-
cent statistics show that wait times for military naturalizations have in-
creased from the FY 2017 average of 8.1 months to the FY 2018 average 
of 10.3 months.59 As noted, the backlog has also climbed for civilian 
naturalization applications: processing times have increased from 8.1 
months in FY 2017 to three years in some places in FY 2019.60 Some 
states have worse processing times. For example, the Colorado State 
Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that 
in Colorado, the average wait time spanned 9.5 to 20 months as of the 
  
 58. Dan Lamothe, Pentagon Faces Internal Questions about Program to Screen Recruits with 
Foreign Ties, Emails Show, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:51 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/03/12/pentagon-faces-internal-questions-
about-program-screen-recruits-with-foreign-ties-emails-show/. 
 59. Historical National Average Processing Time (in Months) for All USCIS Offices for Select 
Forms By Fiscal Year, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-
times/historic-pt (last visited May 4, 2020). 
 60. Id.; see also Check Case Processing Times, supra note 51. 
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time of their report.61 As such, military naturalization processing times 
exceed civilian times in many cases. The long wait contravenes the clear 
legislative intent to provide expedited pathways to citizenship for noncit-
izens in the military. Indeed, the Military Personnel Citizenship Pro-
cessing Act provided that the USCIS must adjudicate military naturaliza-
tion applications in six months, though the statute’s sunset date has 
elapsed.62 However, it is a more complicated inquiry to determine 
whether naturalization applications fall outside normal processing times 
because the USCIS takes the position that no processing time accrues 
when such applications remain in the “pre-examination” stage of the 
agency’s adjudication process.63 The USCIS’s practice of waiting for the 
pre-examination stage before processing N-400 applications extends the 
overall time beyond official backlog figures—if the applications even 
make it to the USCIS.64 
As a functional matter, the combination of U.S. Department of De-
fense and USCIS policies not only slow but halt the expedited military 
program because a service member cannot file an N-400 while back-
ground checks are pending. In some cases, as when a potential naturali-
zation applicant is nearing five years of LPR status (three if eligible 
through marriage to a U.S. citizen), it might be more advantageous for 
LPRs seeking citizenship to remain civilians while applying for naturali-
zation.65 Indeed, “immigration lawyers are now advising LPRs not to 
join the military because it will make their naturalization process more 
difficult.”66 
3. Denials of Military Naturalization  
Another component of decreased total naturalizations is denials of 
military applications. Whereas denial rates for naturalization generally 
have not changed very much, the increased denial of applications for 
military naturalization is unique. Denial rates increased from 2016–2019; 
this makes the denial rate higher than civilian applications. In total, 17% 
of military naturalization applications were denied compared to 11% of 
  
 61. CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Check Case Processing Times, supra 
note 51). 
 62. Immigration and Nationality Act § 328(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1439(a) (2018). 
 63. The Impact of Current Immigration Policies on Service Members and Veterans, and Their 
Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Citizenship of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 116th Cong. 14 (2019) [hereinafter Stock Statement] (statement of Margaret D. Stock, Attor-
ney, Cascadia Cross Border Law Group LLC, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), Military Police Corps, 
U.S. Army Reserves). 
 64. See id. 
 65. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., CHANGES TO THE EXPEDITED NATURALIZATION 
PROCESS FOR MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS 3 (2018) [hereinafter ILRC PRACTICE ADVISORY].
 
 66. Stock Statement, supra note 63, at 22. 
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civilian naturalization applications over the course of the first half of FY 
2019.67 
Figure 3. Total Applications Approved and Denied. 
 
Source: Quarterly data, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Figure 4. Comparison of Military Denial Rates with Civilian Denial 
  Rates. 
 
Source: Quarterly data, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
  
 67. Brittany Blizzard & Jeanne Batalova, Naturalization Trends in the United States, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 11, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/naturalization-
trends-united-states#Military. 
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II. CAUSES OF THE MILITARY NATURALIZATION DECLINE 
A. General Changes to Naturalization Procedures  
As described in Citizenship Delayed, the Trump Administration im-
plemented a number of procedural changes that critics consider an “in-
visible wall” for immigrants.68 These policies impact processing out-
comes for naturalization, generally, and for military naturalization, spe-
cifically. The USCIS announced a change to its deference practices in a 
memorandum titled “Rescission of Guidance Regarding Deference to 
Prior Determinations of Eligibility in the Adjudication of Petitions for 
Extension of Nonimmigrant Status.”69 This memorandum rescinded two 
previous policy memoranda—one from 2004 and one from 2015—that 
directed USCIS adjudicators to defer to prior determinations of eligibility 
in certain, commonly occurring circumstances.70 The Trump Administra-
tion argued that the old policies unduly limited adjudicators, and the new 
policy emphasized that adjudicators “should not feel constrained in re-
questing additional documentation in the course of adjudicating a peti-
tion extension[.]”71 The policy shift away from deference to prior adjudi-
cations concerning the same material facts places additional burdens on 
both the adjudicators and the applicants.72 Some immigration practition-
ers believe that this policy change results in “‘double screening’ and that 
this form of intensified vetting is a significant cause in delays for appli-
cants.”73 This policy change encompasses naturalization. Additionally, 
USCIS officers that spend more time adjudicating nonimmigrant visa 
petitions or green card applications that previously would have received 
deference have less time to adjudicate naturalization applications. 
Another generally applicable policy change is the USCIS’s in-
creased requests for interviews and expanding use of requests for evi-
dence (RFEs) for petitions it is adjudicating. During the summer of 2018, 
the USCIS issued a new policy memorandum regarding when the agency 
will issue RFEs.74 Preexisting policy held that if there were an issue per-
  
 68. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, DECONSTRUCTING THE INVISIBLE WALL: HOW 
POLICY CHANGES BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ARE SLOWING AND RESTRICTING LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION 3 (2018). 
 69. Policy Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Rescission of 
Guidance Regarding Deference to Prior Determinations of Eligibility in the Adjudication of Petitions 
for Extension of Nonimmigrant Status 1 (Oct. 23, 2017) (on file with author). 
 70. Id. at 1–2. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. 6 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MANUAL, pt. G, ch. 6 (2020) (noting 
that the Trump Administration does allow deference for immigrant investor visa petitions for the 
explicit purpose of conserving “scarce agency resources, which should not ordinarily be used to 
duplicate previous efforts”). 
 73. CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 28. 
 74. USCIS Updates Policy Guidance for Certain Requests for Evidence and Notices of Intent 
to Deny, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-
updates-policy-guidance-certain-requests-evidence-and-notices-intent-deny (last updated July 13, 
2018). 
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taining to statutory eligibility, an adjudicator would seek additional evi-
dence from an applicant before denying a petition.75 The use of these 
provisions expanded as agency adjudicators increasingly sought evidence 
pertaining to matters that, previously, would have been considered trivi-
al. For example, an NPR report describes USCIS requests to translate 
birth certificates and verify the legitimacy of well-known employer 
sponsors such as the arch diocese of San Antonio.76 
Staffing decisions and funding allocations to increase the capacity 
to detect fraud, rather than to maximize the total number of naturalization 
applications adjudicated, also affect naturalization outcomes. In 2017, 
the USCIS started making decisions that would allow the agency to meet 
the new requirements imposed by President Trump’s Executive Order 
“Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United 
States.”77 In 2018, the USCIS began hiring “several dozen lawyers and 
immigration officers to review cases of immigrants” suspected of de-
frauding the naturalization process.78 In 2019, USCIS Director Ken 
Cuccinelli boasted that “[r]eferrals to the Fraud Detection and National 
Security Directorate from field offices surpassed [fiscal year] 2018 levels 
by more than 22%.”79 On a local level, the Colorado State Advisory 
Committee found that the Denver Field Office operationalized the re-
strictionist mission by hiring several new officers and assigning them to 
the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS).80 In re-
sponse to a Congressional inquiry, USCIS leadership acknowledged “ex-
treme vetting” and new, in-person interview requirements as contributing 
factors to the continued backlog. At the time, more than five million im-
migrant benefit applications were pending at the USCIS.81 Rather than 
hiring more general adjudicators to address the backlog, the USCIS is 
focusing resources on validating President Trump’s questionable claim 
that mass fraud is being perpetrated in our immigration system. 
  
 75. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 03-14, IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S PREMIUM PROCESSING PROGRAM app. IX (2003). 
 76. Ira Glass, Let Me Count the Ways: Kitchen Sink, THIS AM. LIFE (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/656/let-me-count-the-ways; see also Monica Campbell, Under 
Trump, Immigrants Face Increasingly Long and Complicated Road to Citizenship, PUB. RADIO 
INT’L: THE WORLD (Dec. 6, 2019, 12:45 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-12-06/under-trump-
immigrants-face-increasingly-long-and-complicated-road-citizenship. 
 77. See Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, Exec. 
Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 78. Amy Taxin, APNewsBreak: US Launches Bid to Find Citizenship Cheaters, AP NEWS 
(June 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3. 
 79. Cuccinelli Announces USCIS’ FY 2019 Accomplishments and Efforts to Implement Presi-
dent Trump’s Goals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Oct. 16, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/cuccinelli-announces-uscis-fy-2019-accomplishments-
and-efforts-implement-president-trumps-goals. 
 80. CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 29. 
 81. USCIS RESPONSE LETTER, supra note 42, at 2–3. 
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B. Bureaucratic Bungling and Institutional Neglect of Service Members 
In addition to USCIS procedural changes, the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s procedural changes have made naturalizing harder for service 
members—a surprising outcome given longstanding political support for 
the military. It could be that these outcomes are the result of bureaucratic 
bungling rather than malintent toward service members and veterans. 
Even if it is not intentional, the willingness to tolerate adverse outcomes 
indicates institutional neglect of the needs of service members and veter-
ans. At the U.S. Department of Defense, some procedures designed to 
make background checks more uniform may have been well-intentioned, 
but they still have had the unintentional consequence of depressing mili-
tary naturalization. For example, some veterans believe that policies re-
quiring fingerprints from superiors result from civilian government offi-
cials being unfamiliar with the military. Though they may have good 
intentions of improving military naturalization procedures, their lack of 
understanding leads to inefficient implementation.82 This lack of under-
standing of the average levels of contact between a solider and the supe-
rior required to sign off on certificates of honorable service leads to an 
impracticable standard. The impracticability remains even if the policy 
may not be directed at eliminating applications from USCIS considera-
tion. 
Another form of institutional neglect that displays a lack of concern 
for the vulnerable position of noncitizens in the military is the govern-
ment’s release of identifying information. The U.S. Department of De-
fense inadvertently released names and other identifying details relating 
to more than 4,000 MAVNI recruits in three separate emails between in 
2017 and 2018—the same time frame in which the Pentagon was imple-
menting its procedural changes.83 This kind of personally identifying 
information endangers the lives of these recruits who have served the 
U.S. military.84 The U.S. Department of Defense’s breach included at 
least a dozen asylum applications premised on the danger that the re-
cruits would face if returned to their country of citizenship.85 The U.S. 
Department of Defense acknowledged responsibility for the breach but 
did not issue an apology to recruits whose lives may have been put at 
risk. 
  
 82. See Alex Ward, Why Trump May Not be to Blame for Immigrants Being Booted from the 
Military, VOX (July 9, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/9/17540114/immigrants-
discharged-kicked-military-daca. 
 83. Aline Barros, US Military Data Breach Prompts Immigrant Recruits to Apply for US 
Asylum, VOA NEWS (May 1, 2019, 10:06 AM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-military-data-
breach-prompts-immigrant-recruits-apply-us-asylum; Alex Horton, Hundreds of Immigrant Recruits 
Risk ‘Death Sentence’ After Army Bungles Data, Lawmaker Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2019, 10:03 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/03/06/hundreds-immigrant-recruits-
risk-death-sentence-after-army-bungles-sensitive-data/. 
 84. Barros, supra note 83; Horton, supra note 83. 
 85. Horton, supra note 83. 
684 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:4  
Also, despite the Pentagon’s own policy memoranda altering the 
procedures for military naturalizations, many recruiters remain unaware 
of departures from prior policy. As a result, they continue to promise 
potential noncitizen enlistees that they can naturalize at basic training.86 
Thus, the bureaucracy has not adequately disseminated crucial infor-
mation about policy changes to its public-facing personnel who set ex-
pectations for enlistees seeking naturalization through military service. 
Outside the U.S. Department of Defense, USCIS officials would say 
that the decrease in applications is not caused by their agency.87 From the 
perspective of the USCIS, the agency processes the applications as it 
receives them and delays preceding their processing are not its responsi-
bility.88 It is true that the USCIS receipt of these applications has been 
impacted by U.S. Department of Defense policy changes. But it is also 
true that inadequate communication and inconsistent standards between 
the USCIS and the U.S. Department of Defense contribute to many of the 
gaps in processing of military naturalization.89 
Also, the closure of offices by the USCIS on several bases and con-
tinuous monitoring have made it more difficult for noncitizen service 
members to pursue naturalization.90 A Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) report sought better tracking of noncitizens in the military to 
understand the problem and create avenues for intervention.91 A Con-
gressional inquiry on September 12, 2019, requested further information 
regarding the military naturalization process given the “precipitous drop” 
(65%) in the number of service members applying for and earning U.S. 
citizenship in recent years.92 These documents express concern that, be-
yond substantive changes, there might be a lack of awareness among 
service members about what is needed to seek naturalization or that ser-
  
 86. Stock Statement, supra note 63, at 23. 
 87. Tara Copp, Immigrant Soldiers Now Denied US Citizenship at Higher Rate Than Civil-
ians, MCCLATCHY DC (May 15, 2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/latest-
news/article230269884.html. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. MUZAFFAR CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., NONCITIZENS IN THE U.S. 
MILITARY: NAVIGATING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND RECRUITMENT NEEDS 7 (2019). N-
426 changes and the cessation of MAVNI in October 2017 have led to discharging noncitizen ser-
vice members and cancelling enlistment due to foreign ties of family members, including “foreign 
nexus,” or ties to foreign government and military (Chinese, Russian, Arabic). Some delays are long 
enough to transform legal immigrants on visas into undocumented immigrants with expired creden-
tials. Calixto v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 18-1551, 2019 WL 2139755 (D.D.C. May 16, 2019). 
The “continuous monitoring” of naturalized citizen soldiers was ruled unlawful. Tiwari v. Mattis, 
363 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1173 (W.D. Wash. 2019); ILRC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 65, at 2; 
Resources Related to DOD’s Tightening of Rules and Discharges of Immigrants from the Military, 
AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (May 26, 2020), https://www.aila.org/infonet/dod-tightens-rules-for-
immigrants-joining-military. 
 91. GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 54, at 19. 
 92. Letter from Congress to Mark T. Esper, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., and Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 12, 2019) (on file 
with author). 
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vice members may be confused about procedures in light of heightened 
requirements. There might also be a “chilling effect” on unit leaders that 
would have previously provided assistance for service members filling 
out required paperwork for naturalization. 
C. National Security 
In terms of substantive policy changes, national security dwarfs all 
other concerns in the context of military naturalization. In the wake of 
killings of soldiers at Fort Hood,93 threats to service members from allied 
troops,94 and evolving concerns about “foreign nexus” breaches of the 
U.S. military following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,95 na-
tional security measures have tightened within the military ranks.96 In 
general, these policies’ increasing emphasis on national security have led 
to higher scrutiny of military naturalization applications. Cognizant of 
the need for loyalty and the risk of conflict, the U.S. Department of De-
fense must certify a service member’s military service as honorable. This 
requires the service member to complete USCIS Form N-426 before 
qualifying for expedited citizenship under INA § 329.97 The service 
member must then submit Form N-426 alongside their application for 
naturalized citizenship (N-400).98 
1. U.S. Department of Defense Policies 
On October 13, 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense implemented 
several key changes pertaining to background checks and honorable ser-
vice certifications. Background screenings must not only be initiated but 
also completed before basic training.99 The National Background Inves-
tigations Bureau (NBIB) was recently transferred from the Office of Per-
sonal Management into the U.S. Department of Defense to address the 
large backlog of background checks and security clearance applica-
tions.100 The U.S. Department of Defense Memo also implemented a new 
  
 93. The Shootings at Fort Hood, NPR, https://www.npr.org/series/120206378/the-shootings-
at-fort-hood (last visited May 5, 2020). 
 94. Lolita C. Baldor, US Digs into Saudi Shooting Suspect Motive in Navy Shooting, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/1102076110d04018176b4f7f12017347; W.J. 
Hennigan, ‘I Don’t Have Seven Arms to Hug Them All.’ A Year After Their Father’s Death in Af-
ghanistan, a Mother and Her Children Struggle to Move On, TIME (Oct. 10, 2019, 6:16 AM), 
https://time.com/5696969/family-of-fallen-soldier/. 
 95. Lamothe, supra note 58. 
 96. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 97. Naturalization for Military Members and Their Families, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERV., https://my.uscis.gov/exploremyoptions/naturalization_through_military (last visited May 5, 
2020). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Memorandum from A.M. Kurta, Performing the Duties of the Under Sec’y of Def. for 
Pers. and Readiness, to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts Commandant of the Coast Guard 2 (Oct. 
13, 2017) [hereinafter Oct. 13 DoD Memo] (on file with author). 
 100. Richard Sisk, DoD Takes Over Troubled Background Check Agency and its Backlog, 
MILITARY.COM (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/10/03/dod-takes-over-
troubled-background-check-agency-and-its-backlog.html. 
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requirement that service members must complete at least 180 days of 
active duty before receiving certifications of honorable service.101 At the 
same time, the U.S. Department of Defense implemented a policy change 
that only a high-level officer in the pay grade of O-6 (colonel or Navy 
captain) or higher may sign the N-426 form (certification of honorable 
service), and they must provide an original signature.102 Prior to the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s policy interventions, any commanding officer 
with access to the applicant’s military personnel file could have signed 
off on the certification.103 Shortly thereafter in January 2018, the Trump 
Administration terminated the popular and highly successful Basic Train-
ing Naturalization Initiative.104 This program had previously operated for 
nearly ten years.105 
These problematic policy changes put noncitizens that enlist in the 
military at risk of becoming stateless or facing retribution from the gov-
ernment of their original country of citizenship.106 A noncitizen service 
member would previously have their naturalization promptly adjudicated 
by the USCIS.107 Now the requisite U.S. Department of Defense back-
ground checks and signatures take longer to secure than the temporary 
visas that allowed these people to enlist.108 Accordingly, the number of 
individuals able to complete the naturalization process before their visas 
expire is declining.109 This dynamic may also disincentivize noncitizens 
from seeking to enlist in the military in the future if they fear the gov-
ernment’s promise of citizenship will not be honored.  
The new N-426 policies have been successfully challenged in class 
action lawsuits.110 The most recent suit, Samma v. U.S. Department of 
Defense,111 filed in April 2020, is the first to represent all noncitizen ser-
vice members.112 The suit alleges, among other things, that the policies 
“unlawfully obstructed the ability of thousands of service members to 
obtain U.S. citizenship, placing them in a state of personal and profes-
  
 101. Oct. 13 DoD Memo, supra note 99, at 2. 
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. The Impact of Current Immigration Policies on Service Members and Veterans, and Their 
Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Citizenship of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 116th Cong. 8 (2019) (statement of Jennie Pasquarella, Director of Immigrants’ Rights and 
Senior Staff Attorney ACLU of Southern California). 
 104. Stock Statement, supra note 63, at 17. 
 105. Id. at 18. 
 106. MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, EARNED CITIZENSHIP 79–80 (2019). 
 107. Id. at 80. 
 108. Stock Statement, supra note 63, at 26. 
 109. Copp, supra note 87. 
 110. See generally Kirwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 285 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D.D.C. 2017) (issuing a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the N-426 policy as applied to Selected Reserve MAVNI service 
members who have not received an N-426 certification); Nio v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 323 
F.R.D. 28 (D.D.C. 2017) (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining N-426 policy as applied specif-
ically to the plaintiff noncitizen service members.) 
 111. Samma v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 1:20-cv-01104 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 28, 2020). 
 112. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, Samma, No. 1:20-cv-
01104 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 28, 2020).  
2020] CITIZENSHIP DENIED 687 
sional limbo.”113 Specifically, the suit alleges that the N-426 policy is 
unlawful because it “directly violates Congress’s clear command that 
[the] DoD play a purely ministerial role in certifying honorable ser-
vice.”114 
2. MAVNI 
The underlying worries about national security can be seen particu-
larly acutely in MAVNI. The MAVNI program was suspended in 2016 
due to concerns from Defense Secretary James Mattis and a U.S. De-
partment of Defense Inspector General report detailing security risks 
associated with falsified identification documents used for enlistment and 
possible foreign infiltration.115 In June 2017, the Pentagon Inspector 
General issued a classified report titled “Evaluation of Military Services’ 
Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Pro-
gram Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs (Classified).”116 Alt-
hough its contents are not public at this time, various news outlets re-
ported that the Inspector General “identif[ied] serious problems with 
Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest[.]”117 Representative 
Steve Russell (R-OK), a former officer in the Army who sits on the 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel in the House of 
Representatives, cited “foreign infiltration” as a concern.118 
Since MAVNI was suspended when the new U.S. Department of 
Defense and U.S. Department of Justice policies went into effect, it can-
not be the direct cause of the decreased applications so much as a parallel 
casualty of increased scrutiny.119 Yet, it is illustrative of the national se-
curity that may be revived in other settings.120 
  
 113. Id. at 5.  
 114. Id. at 6.  
 115. Recently, a federal district court found the severity of these concerns uncompelling based 
on the sole example presented by the government at trial. That individual was deceived into enrol-
ling in “a fake school created by the Department of Homeland Security as part of a ‘sting’ operation 
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for a fee.” Tiwari v. Mattis, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 
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MILITARY SERVICES’ COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY ACCESSIONS VITAL TO THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST PROGRAM SECURITY REVIEWS AND MONITORING PROGRAMS (CLASSIFIED) (2017). 
 117. Pentagon Investigators Find ‘Security Risks’ in Government’s Immigrant Recruitment 
Program, ‘Infiltration’ Feared, FOX NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017) [hereinafter ‘Infiltration’ Feared], 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pentagon-investigators-find-security-risks-in-governments-
immigrant-recruitment-program-infiltration-feared. 
 118. Id. 
 119. An ILRC practice advisory says MAVNI was not impacted by recent policy changes since 
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ADVISORY, supra note 65, at 5. 
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GAO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 54, at 19. The program suspension has been 
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these individuals were told their discharge was the result of being labeled “security risks because 
they have relatives abroad,” or that the Department of Defense had not completed background 
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3. CARRP 
If naturalization applicants pass military background checks with 
the U.S. Department of Defense, they encounter another vetting program 
within the USCIS called the Controlled Application Review and Resolu-
tion Program (CARRP).121 CARRP requires adjudicating officers to 
identify applications that raise national security concerns and thoroughly 
investigate the applicant’s background, in consultation with supervisors 
and other agencies, to determine whether the applicant is statutorily eli-
gible to naturalize.122 Resolution may require communication with law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies to determine whether information is 
relevant to an applicant and, if so, whether the information has an impact 
on eligibility for the benefit.123 The full processing of an application 
flagged for national security involves four steps: (1) identification of the 
national security concern, (2) assessment of applicant’s eligibility for the 
benefit sought, (3) completion of external vetting, and (4) approval from 
a USCIS deputy director and a member of the leadership for the Head-
quarters’ Office of Fraud Detection and National Security.124 During this 
process, the applicant does not have access to information regarding 
where their application is in the adjudicatory process.125 
While CARRP is not designed specifically for military naturaliza-
tions, the criteria suggest that some immigrants in the military seeking 
naturalization may be flagged. CARRP flags naturalization applications 
for national security concerns or if an officer finds an applicant to be a 
“Known or Suspected Terrorist,” which can result in placement on the 
Terrorist Watch List.126 According to a report by the ACLU, most of 
these applications originate in Muslim-majority and Middle Eastern 
countries.127 
The interplay between military naturalizations and CARRP is 
cloaked in secrecy given that there are few public test cases. However, a 
  
checks on them. Despite acknowledgement that “[i]mmigrant recruits are already screened far more 
than any other recruits we have,” according to Naomi Verdugo, a former senior recruiting official for 
the Army at the Pentagon, the U.S. Department of Defense continues to explore strategies for ex-
panding its vetting process for immigrant recruits. Alex Horton, U.S. Army Kills Contracts for Hun-
dreds of Immigrant Recruits. Some Face Deportation, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:14 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/09/15/army-kills-contracts-for-
hundreds-of-immigrant-recruits-sources-say-some-face-deportation/. 
 121. Memorandum from Don Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Servs., to Field Leadership, U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Servs. 1–2 (June 5, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Neufeld CARRP Guidance Memo] (on file with author). 
 122. Id. at 1–2, 4. 
 123. Id. at 4–5. 
 124. Id. at 2–8. 
 125. See CITIZENSHIP DELAYED, supra note 4, at 26, 29–30. 
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inafter Scharfen CARRP Guidance Memo] (on file with author). 
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USCIS Memo to Field Office leadership discusses CARRP proce-
dures.128 In the context of concurrent I-485 and N-400 filings, the USCIS 
memo clarifies that the field office processing the N-400 has jurisdiction 
over the consolidation of the pending military naturalization application 
and the I-485 application for LPR status in the USCIS electronic Fraud 
Detection and National Security-Data System.129 CARRP memos suggest 
that if an officer identifies a Known or Suspected Terrorist security issue 
but can identify a separate ground of ineligibility that is not based on 
national security, the application should be denied on that separate 
ground. This policy seeks to optimize efficient adjudication as well as 
avoid exposure of sensitive national security information.130 Thus, appli-
cants flagged for CARRP may never know the part CARRP played in 
their adjudication. 
Also, the USCIS offers broad guidance to field offices that under 
CARRP “actions that do not meet the threshold for criminal prosecution 
(e.g., indicators of fraud, foreign travel, and information concerning em-
ployment or family relationships) may be relevant to a benefit determina-
tion.”131 While records of military naturalization applications flagged for 
CARRP are not publicly available, the sweeping requirements for 
CARRP suggest that military applicants may be impacted and subse-
quently delayed or denied. 
4. Military Service Suitability Determination and Foreign Nexus 
In January 2019, news media reported that the Pentagon was insti-
tuting a new vetting process to scrutinize its recruits’ potential ties to 
foreign adversaries.132 Reportedly known as Foreign Nexus Screening 
and Vetting (FNSV), the Pentagon added this additional screening mech-
anism out of concern that a noncitizen recruit’s foreign ties could expose 
the U.S. military to a national security risk. Stephanie P. Miller, who 
manages recruitment policy for the Pentagon, stated in court filings that 
“[f]oreign nationals, including those with [green-card] status, raise 
unique counterintelligence and counterterrorism concerns because of the 
heightened susceptibility to influence by foreign governments and organ-
izations and because of the difficulty in verifying information about them 
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that is maintained overseas[.]”133 The additional layer of background 
vetting under FNSV, however, would apply to all recruits, regardless of 
their citizenship status.134 Thus, the Pentagon’s concerns about foreign-
born recruits contributing to an increased threat to national security ap-
pears to extend beyond the security concerns specifically cited with ref-
erence to MAVNI. 
Nevertheless, the Pentagon has not formally announced a rollout of 
FNSV, and it is not clear whether “foreign nexus” screening has been 
implemented in practice. As recently as March of 2019, FNSV remained 
under consideration in a “pre-decisional state” within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense.135 The Pentagon’s concerns about national security, 
however, seem likely to precipitate intensified background checks of 
noncitizen recruits. Regardless of whether the U.S. Department of De-
fense formally implements the proposed FNSV vetting program, con-
cerns over noncitizen service members with foreign ties persist in exist-
ing Pentagon background check procedures, as illustrated by outcomes 
from the background check process for noncitizen enlistment. Prolonged 
background checks for MAVNI recruits—involving a determination 
made by U.S. Department of Defense officials known as the “Military 
Service Suitability Determination” (MSSD)—not only hinder naturaliza-
tion, but they prevent recruits from reporting for basic training until the 
background check process is complete. To report to basic training, 
noncitizen enlistees must complete the MSSD screening and obtain a 
favorable determination.136 The outcomes generated by these background 
checks include incongruous and sometimes “patently absurd” results, 
whereby noncitizens fail background checks because of their relatives’ 
history of military service in countries that engage in joint military op-
erations with the United States, such as South Korea.137 Currently, there 
is a case challenging failed background checks that is pending in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, Calixto v. U.S. Department of 
the Army.138 
The military also follows background procedures for noncitizens 
based on the adjudicative guidelines which provide that any tie to a for-
eign country is “disqualifying.”139 For example, recruits have been dis-
charged for having parents from foreign countries, which triggers a find-
ing of “derogatory information.”140 Similar issues result when nonciti-
zens possess foreign bank accounts or have relatives who have served in 
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foreign military organizations—all of which are common to the back-
grounds of noncitizen recruits, but nevertheless trigger abrupt dis-
charge.141  
Each of these existing and proposed programs leads, or would lead, 
to delays, denials, and overall declines in military naturalizations. 
D. Immigration Enforcement 
Another substantive change reckons with an obvious fact: nonciti-
zens in the military are immigrants and may be included in the broader 
immigration policy agenda that casts an aura of suspicion toward for-
eigners, despite their veteran status. Indeed, suspicion toward immi-
grants’ foreign status may be even higher in the high-stakes arena of mil-
itary affairs that frequently involves national security. Assuredly, it can 
be hard to determine whether discriminatory intent motivates specific 
policies that hinder noncitizen soldiers or if the harmful impacts of these 
policies are incidental. The Citizenship Delayed report noted no direct 
evidence of intentional delay, though it acknowledged copious contextu-
al evidence.142 Alleged national security concerns can be conflated with 
racism, islamophobia, and mistrust of foreigners. And suspicion toward 
foreigners can result in disparate impacts toward noncitizens without 
running afoul of anti-discrimination law that requires direct evidence of 
intent.143 It is often especially hard to assess national security justifica-
tions for pretext given that evidence linking terrorist incidents with poli-
cy changes can be, and often is, classified. Moreover, courts give broad 
deference to the justifications for adopting policies in the military, if they 
are reviewed at all.144 Still, there is some evidence that national security 
justifications may not be based on actual evidence. A recent study ana-
lyzing the immigration status and country of origin of perpetrators of 
violent terrorist acts found that attacks by American-born perpetrators 
considerably outnumber those committed by foreign-born individuals: 
788 American-born terrorists either planned, attempted, or carried out 
attacks on U.S. soil compared to 192 foreign-born individuals from 1975 
through 2017.145 
There are additional enlistment restrictions for citizens and perma-
nent residents with undocumented family. Some branches of the armed 
services have policies and practices pertaining to enlistees with undocu-
mented immediate family members. For example, the U.S. Army and Air 
Force have no official regulations to this effect, but a spokesperson con-
firmed the Army has an unwritten policy prohibiting U.S. citizens or 
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LPRs from enlisting if their spouses or children are present in the United 
States without lawful immigration status.146 The Marine Corps bars the 
enlistment of applicants whose spouses or children do not have legal 
status by policy: “[a]pplicants with dependents (spouse and/or children) 
will not be enlisted . . . if any dependent (spouse and/or child(ren) is an 
undocumented illegal alien [sic].”147 Similarly, a Navy regulation pro-
vides, “[a]pplicants with foreign alien dependents residing in the United 
States illegally are not enlistment eligible until their dependents become 
properly admitted into the United States and obtain a Social Security 
card, or no longer reside unlawfully in the United States.”148 
The combination of procedural and substantive changes to military 
naturalization collectively contributes to the troubling portrait of citizen-
ship denials, delays, and declines. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY NATURALIZATION BACKLOG 
The consequence of these delays, denials, and decreases in military 
naturalization are worrisome for the service members seeking to natural-
ize and for the core institutions of citizenship and democracy. This Sec-
tion details the costs for individual service members’ civil rights, voting 
rights, and due process rights. It goes on to describe the collective costs 
for the core institutions of citizenship: Congress’s mandate to grant citi-
zenship for military service, the military ideal of earned citizenship, and 
the meaning of citizenship for those seeking to obtain it but for institu-
tional barriers. 
The Citizenship Delayed government report found: 
The substantial delay to naturalization created by the backlog nega-
tively impacts voting rights, civil rights, and the administration of 
justice. The effect on voting rights is obvious; the right to vote de-
pends on completing the naturalization process. By the time this re-
port is released, applications in the queue for citizenship will not be 
processed in time for applicants to participate in the 2020 presidential 
elections. Immigrants, whose eligibility for employment and public 
benefits hinges on citizenship, may have their civil rights negatively 
impacted by the backlog. There may also be disproportionate impacts 
borne by certain classes of individuals based on U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service’s policies, but more information is needed about 
applicants’ race, national origin, and religious background in order to 
make that determination. The existence of such a substantial backlog 
of naturalization applications and wait times raises concerns about 
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the administration of justice and whether immigrants’ due process 
rights are being violated.149 
A. Voting and Civil Rights 
These general consequences for the naturalization backlog are relat-
ed to the military backlog. Noncitizens who do not naturalize cannot 
vote.150 They cannot access a variety of economic and social benefits, 
such as specific government jobs, grants, financial aid, and public bene-
fits.151 Noncitizen veterans have access to special benefits, such as VA 
care, which can be negatively impacted if they are discharged from the 
military or lose their citizenship status.152 Additionally, civil rights are 
impacted if the reasons for their military discharge or more heavily scru-
tinized naturalization applications relate to their place of birth. 
Of particular note is the notion of dismissal of noncitizen service 
members for alleged foreign nexus. According to agency regulations: 
Foreign nexus means specific indications that a covered person is or 
may be engaged in clandestine or unreported relationships with for-
eign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorists; con-
tacts with foreign intelligence services; or other hostile activities di-
rected against DOE facilities, property, personnel, programs or con-
tractors by or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, 
or international terrorists.153 
The Washington Post reported that a predecisional memo attributed 
to Joseph D. Kernan (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) and 
James N. Stewart (Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness) circulated among senior officials within the U.S. Department 
of Defense and reportedly says, “[o]ne primary concern associated with 
qualifying for these positions relates to the potential counterintelligence 
or terrorism risks, . . . [t]he department must implement expanded for-
eign vetting and screening protocols to identify and mitigate the foreign 
nexus risks.”154 By definition, foreign contacts include persons, such as 
family members, and organizations, such as banks. To use these foreign 
ties as grounds for dismissal or disfavorable treatment unfairly excludes 
immigrants from the U.S. military. While discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship is not unlawful,155 it is ironic since many are recruited to 
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serve the U.S. military precisely because they possess knowledge, skills, 
and relationships deemed valuable to the U.S. military mission by virtue 
of their lives abroad. There may be additional discriminatory targeting on 
the basis of race, religion, or national origin when foreign nexus is con-
strued to apply only to certain countries. When Chinese and Russian re-
cruits face heightened scrutiny, the reasons may be related to unlawful 
discrimination rather than purported national security since terrorist or-
ganizations are not prevalent in these countries.  
B. Vulnerability to Immigration Enforcement.  
A key concern if noncitizens serving in the military do not natural-
ize is that they may lose their path to legal permanent residence and citi-
zenship. The risk of immigration enforcement arises if the service mem-
bers are discharged during enlistment, but before naturalization, or if 
they are denied naturalization altogether.156 This leaves their citizenship 
status in limbo. For those beginning with a green card, delay or denial 
means losing the corollary rights and benefits of citizenship, such as vot-
ing. Delay or denial may expose immigrants to deportation if their path-
way to citizenship exists only because of military service—for example, 
failure to naturalize could lead to expiration of their visa or green card 
and result in undocumented status. This could result in deportation to 
countries that the noncitizen has little connection with after leaving for 
the United States at a young age or after spending years living and serv-
ing in the military as a U.S. LPR.157 
There is another way non-naturalized service members are acutely 
vulnerable to immigration enforcement: service members are prone to 
PTSD and substance abuse following deployment.158 Substance abuse is 
among a variety of convictions that can trigger deportation, even after 
rehabilitation or jail time. One study estimated that 239 veterans have 
been deported to 34 countries.159 Due to deceptive recruiting practices 
and institutional bungling described in this Article, some of these veter-
ans were even eligible for citizenship at the time they were deported. 
Hector Barajas, for example, is a deported veteran who founded Support 
House in Rosarito, Baja California, Mexico. Due to the notoriety of his 
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case, he was later pardoned by the governor of California, naturalized, 
and returned to the United States.160 But there continue to be other cases 
of deported veterans. In 2019, Jose Segovia Benitez was removed in the 
dead of night, despite his pending case for citizenship, honorable service, 
and lack of connections to the conflict-ridden country he left as a tod-
dler.161 In some cases, deportation can even lead to statelessness, as ser-
vice members can become ineligible for citizenship in their home coun-
tries as a result of their military service.162 
There can be adverse spill-over effects for families of service mem-
bers who would qualify for citizenship and its associated benefits as de-
rivatives, but whose eligibility for benefits and immunity to deportation 
depend on their military family member naturalizing. For example, a 
MAVNI recruit who earns his pathway to citizenship through service 
will not be able to sponsor his spouse or children until his own naturali-
zation is complete. Currently, the policy at the USCIS is to bar those 
applications of immigrants with undocumented family members, despite 
the continuing requirement for noncitizen men to register for military 
service in the event of a military draft.163 
C. Undermining Congressional Mandate and Agency Mission 
Beyond the harms to individual service members, Congress’s aims 
are thwarted when noncitizens serving in the military are unable to ac-
cess promised benefits. The Immigration and Nationality Act makes 
clear Congress’s intention to expedite naturalized citizenship for those 
who serve in the military.164 The high barriers to entry, long delays in 
processing, and unsupported denials of applications contravene this leg-
islative intent. 
In addition, the agencies charged with implementing expedited mili-
tary naturalization neglect their delegated authority and statutory timeline 
when delaying and denying naturalization. In 2018, as part of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),165 Congress mandated that 
the armed services provide information to their members about the avail-
ability and the process of naturalizing through military service.166 In Sec-
tion 530 of the 2018 NDAA, the statute provides that: 
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The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that members of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who are aliens lawfully admitted 
to the United States for permanent residence are informed of the 
availability of naturalization through service in the Armed Forces 
under section 328 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1439) and the process by which to pursue naturalization. The Secre-
tary shall ensure that resources are available to assist qualified mem-
bers of the Armed Forces to navigate the application and naturaliza-
tion process.167 
A unified telephone hotline and website (militaryonesource.mil) set 
forth the process and tout the benefits of naturalizing through military 
service.168 The package of benefits is an important recruitment tool for 
the military and failures to deliver impede the realization of recruiting 
goals and the benefits awarded to those who serve.  
Also, although responsibility for naturalizing ultimately lies with 
the USCIS (whose services are hyperlinked on the Military OneSource 
page), the USCIS’s deference to military background checks and certifi-
cations of honorable service prior to processing the standard N-400 
means that any bottlenecks in U.S. Department of Defense procedure 
have downstream impacts on naturalization.  
If and when the applications reach the USCIS—and lately they may 
not—the immigration bureaucracy comes into play. The USCIS is lodged 
within the DHS and is specifically tasked with servicing immigration 
benefits such as naturalization applications. As described in the Citizen-
ship Delayed report, the recent exclusionary emphasis and unprecedented 
backlogs at the USCIS constitutes “mission drift”169 and may violate the 
agency’s mandate. In 2003, Congress purposefully separated the en-
forcement functions and the service functions of the dissolved Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service when it created the DHS.170 This was 
done in response to concerns that the enforcement functions negatively 
impacted the agency’s ability to provide services.171 Although the statu-
tory mandate of the USCIS has not changed, on February 22, 2018, the 
official USCIS mission statement removed references to customer ser-
vice and added greater emphasis on the protection of Americans and 
securing the homeland.172 USCIS officers have indicated that ensuring 
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compliance with immigration law and inspecting fraud and national se-
curity risks are part of their benefits adjudication function, not diversions 
from it. They assert it is in keeping with the FDNS program description 
stating that the directorate’s primary mission is to investigate those who 
pose a threat to national security, public safety, or the integrity of the 
nation’s legal immigration system.173 This logic is dubious when applied 
to service members who have already been cleared for higher levels of 
security and whose fidelity to the United States has already been proven 
on the battlefield. In addition, the USCIS has its own processes in place 
for military naturalization that are thwarted when U.S. Department of 
Defense background checks impede applications from reaching their 
desk.174 
Changes to military naturalization could also undermine the goals of 
the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. Department of Defense estab-
lishes recruiting targets for each year to fulfill the agency’s traditional 
mission “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect 
the security of our country.”175 Meeting these recruiting targets is an an-
nual struggle for some branches of the armed forces. The average wait 
time for LPRs to join the U.S. military has grown to 354 days as opposed 
to 168 for U.S. citizens, raising the possibility that the Navy would miss 
its recruiting goals.176 Both the Navy and the Marine Corps reported 
more than 1,000 LPR recruits awaiting background checks before being 
allowed to report for their training in 2016–2017, before the policy was 
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suspended in 2018.177 Additionally, McClatchy reported that the Army 
fell short of its annual recruiting targets in 2018 by greater than 6,500 
personnel.178 The shrinking recruitment pools also constrain the mili-
tary’s long-established role as an institution of socialization and engine 
of equality. 
D. Due Process and Administration of Justice 
Basic principles of fairness and the administration of justice that 
arise under the due process clause and the APA are compromised when 
citizenship is not granted for military service.  
The purpose of making naturalization an administrative process is to 
provide fair, efficient implementation of the right to naturalize set forth 
by Congress in the INA, to be executed by civil servants who gain exper-
tise and act without an overtly partisan agenda. The irregularities in re-
cruitment and long delays in processing applications deviate from these 
purposes. Furthermore, the vague grounds cited for denial, and the over-
all increase in denials, suggest arbitrariness in the decision-making pro-
cess. The arbitrariness is exacerbated by the issuance of memorandums 
and policies that are not readily available to the public and that have not 
undergone notice and comment procedures required in the APA.179 Due 
process may be implicated if military service members are being misled 
about their eligibility for naturalized citizenship. These due process con-
cerns may also arise where military service members are discharged on 
questionable grounds, such as their foreign status, that made them attrac-
tive to the military for recruiting. These concerns are particularly pro-
nounced because naturalization, as compared to visas, is not discretion-
ary. If anything, Congress made it particularly clear that they wanted 
service members to have a path to citizenship through the military.180 
For service members who have laid their lives on the line, or indi-
cated a willingness to do so, these broken promises seem especially un-
fair. 
E. Citizenship and Democracy 
More generally, the willingness to thwart the principle of “citizen-
ship for service” compromises the notion of jus meritum, or earned citi-
zenship.181 Representative Scanlon noted the “cost to our national securi-
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ty and our national honor” of the current administration’s policies during 
a House Judiciary Committee hearing on policies impacting noncitizens 
in the military.182 This concept of citizenship for service refers to a theo-
retical justification for citizenship based on active commitment to the 
nation or earned citizenship.183 While jus sanguinis and jus solis remain 
the primary routes to citizenship, the tradition of offering citizenship for 
service is historical and has a statutory basis.184 Changing this important 
basis for citizenship undermines a long history of institutional affiliation 
via the loyalty of solider citizens.  
Additionally, the notion of earned citizenship is seen as the norma-
tive ideal in the broader context of nonmilitary naturalization where the 
rhetoric of earning citizenship has been a prerequisite for legalization for 
more than a million undocumented immigrants.185 Recent policy devel-
opments challenge the sincerity of the concept of earned citizenship. 
These troubling trends also strike at the durability of naturalized citizen-
ship in lieu of a lesser form of citizenship under certain conditions—for 
example, when the military diversifies, when the United States is en-
gaged in extended military conflicts, or when immigration policies are 
infected by a restrictionist fervor.186 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. General Recommendations for Naturalization 
The Citizenship Delayed report to the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights made several recommendations to improve naturalization pro-
cessing times and reduce the backlog. First, it recommended that indi-
vidual applicants seek mandamus relief and other remedies in federal 
court to cure unreasonable agency delay.187 The Administrative Proce-
dure Act directs agencies to conclude matters presented to them “within 
a reasonable time,”188 and stipulates that a reviewing court shall compel 
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agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.189 Individu-
als with applications that have been pending in the backlog for far past 
the recommended processing time of six months may merit mandamus 
relief, which would compel agency action.190 These actions tend to be 
effective, even if they can be expensive to file and may require obtaining 
counsel. Individuals can also reach out to the U.S. Attorney’s office or 
the USCIS Ombudsman for intervention.191 
Second, the Citizenship Delayed report recommended the USCIS 
revisit policies that result in more intensive vetting and longer processing 
time at the cost of efficient adjudication.192 It recommended that the 
agency streamline the adjudication process to focus on statutory and reg-
ulatory requirements for naturalization, especially in pre-election 
years.193 It encouraged a better balance of service and screening in light 
of the primary mission of the agency to adjudicate benefits, and it ex-
pressed particular concern about the allocation of resources toward Fraud 
Detection and National Security and away from front-line adjudica-
tion.194 The report noted that the DHS Office of Inspector General and 
InfoPass are sources of internal accountability for the USCIS’s agency 
performance.195 
Third, the report discussed the need for greater congressional ac-
countability through letters of inquiry, oversight hearings, and monitor-
ing.196 The Government Accountability Office, which has looked into the 
military naturalization backlog, could assist Congress’s effort.197 Follow-
ing the model of the 2005 intervention that led to a reduction of the back-
log previously, the report suggested a temporary appropriation ear-
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marked for backlog.198 Funds would need to be channeled toward adjudi-
cation as opposed to other USCIS Operations. Assistance with N-400 
preparation from local government offices, community organizations, 
and immigration lawyers would encourage people to file for naturalized 
citizenship in the face of delays or mistrust of government.199  
B. Specific Recommendations for Military Naturalization 
This Article endorses all of these ideas and expands on them for 
military naturalization. 
This Article recommends the following supplemental measures for 
the military naturalization process. Initially, the government should cure 
the collective costs of impeding citizenship for service by ensuring that 
the social contract with service members is honored regardless of noncit-
izen status. If the principle of citizenship for service cannot be honored 
due to national security or operational concerns, Congress should rewrite 
enlistment provisions to no longer require male immigrants to register for 
selective service if they cannot also earn citizenship through their mili-
tary service. 
If military naturalizations are delayed and denied, the USCIS should 
reopen military naturalization applications that were denied or aban-
doned because an individual was unable to follow through on the U.S. 
Department of Defense naturalization process as a result of their military 
service.200 
Additional suggestions are tailored to the type of immigrant serving 
in the military. 
1. Lawful Permanent Residents Serving in the Military 
Beyond institutional streamlining of military naturalization, LPRs 
who serve in the military would benefit from harmonizing U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense background checks and USCIS vetting. The USCIS’s 
policy of automatically delaying their own processing of military N-400s 
until the U.S. Department of Defense process is complete should be re-
visited in lieu of crafting an interagency memorandum of understanding 
about how best to proceed in situations of delay or prejudicial findings. 
On its merits, the U.S. Department of Defense should reexamine the 
2017 changes to MSDD policies that are impeding background checks. 
For the same reason, they should resist the proposed foreign nexus poli-
cies that would exacerbate delay and prejudicial findings.201 Strengthen-
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ing pathways and increasing resources to compel agency adjudication at 
both the USCIS and the U.S. Department of Defense could help these 
agencies meet Congressional and agency timetables.202 The usual natu-
ralization process includes a writ of mandamus and a federal jurisdiction 
procedure for compelling action; a September 2019 lawsuit finding de-
lays for military translators unlawful under the APA suggests these types 
of remedies could be extended or tailored for military service mem-
bers.203 Margaret Stock’s Congressional Written Testimony includes 
other examples of military naturalization applicants initiating individual 
lawsuits against the USCIS to compel processing of their applications.204  
A more ambitious reform is to make naturalization occur by opera-
tion of law under the INA in cases where enlisting immigrants expect to 
become eligible for citizenship.205 Congress has already made eligibility 
for LPR status automatic and has consolidated the LPR and naturaliza-
tion phases for military service members.206 The next step is to further 
streamline the process so that service members who enlist become not 
only eligible but also automatically considered for LPR status and natu-
ralization, whether at the time of enlistment or completion of basic train-
ing.207 Whatever the particulars, more USCIS support and better coordi-
nation between the USCIS and the U.S. Department of Defense would 
smooth the military naturalization process. Examples include reversing 
USCIS office closures, strengthening appeals processes, and expanding 
the American Immigration Lawyers Association’s military assistance 
program.208 
For the service members who do not make it through the enlistment 
process due to the U.S. Department of Defense background check delays 
or denials, it will be important to consider ways to ameliorate the conse-
quences. The U.S. Department of Defense has instituted an appeals pro-
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cess for discharged service members to learn why they were dismissed, 
which would serve as an additional check before the removal operation 
goes into full force.209 The GAO report recommends better tracking of 
veterans flagged for removal and communication across the agencies 
involved in effectuating removal—for instance, ICE, the Executive Of-
fice for Immigration Review’s immigration court, and the Board of Im-
migration Appeals. Additionally, the 2019 GAO report and the Congres-
sional hearing on the impact of immigration policies on service members 
and veterans recommended policies to give veterans special considera-
tion before deporting them210—for example, listing military service as a 
positive equity in deferred action or cancellation of removal, or making a 
statutory exception to other INA provisions that bar relief.211 The DHS 
has agreed to the GAO recommendations to track veterans flagged for 
removal and said it would update its training and issue guidance for ICE 
agents by May 2020.212 
2. Nonimmigrants and Undocumented Immigrants in the Military 
Lawfully present persons, including formerly undocumented immi-
grants holding a temporary status and other nonimmigrants, were eligible 
to serve in the military in circumstances specified by statute213 until 
MAVNI was suspended in 2016 due to national security concerns.214 
Addressing the security concerns voiced by the Office of Inspector 
General that led to the suspension of the MAVNI program would allow 
the program to be restored, an outcome that former Defense Secretary 
Jim Mattis said in 2017 he would favor.215 It is difficult to know all of the 
reasons MAVNI was terminated because some of this information re-
mains classified. Some of the concerns may be valid. For example, the 
government has argued that there are certain vulnerabilities inherent in 
MAVNI. These vulnerabilities are attributable to the limited amount of 
time many MAVNI soldiers have spent in the United States and the sus-
ceptibility of MAVNI soldiers to exploitation due to their prior relation-
ships.216 These concerns can be addressed by fixing the forms of gov-
ernment vetting, rather than eliminating the program altogether.217 
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The U.S. Department of Defense operates other security programs 
with different procedures and standards that make access to classified 
information subject to an adjudicative process that “determines access 
level based on eligibility, need-to-know, and the requirements of the po-
sition held.”218 The U.S. Department of Defense could adapt their pro-
cess for non-LPR recruits. They could also route these recruits into posi-
tions that do not require higher security clearances, such as military 
translator, biomedical equipment specialist, or artillery mechanic. 
If avenues for enlisting non-LPRs are unworkable due to attempted 
exploitation by foreign adversaries, then alternative programs should be 
created that eliminate national security risks while allowing undocu-
mented people to access citizenship through military service. A legisla-
tive path for undocumented people to earn a green card and citizenship 
through military service such as the ENLIST Act could be considered.219 
The Act would amend the citizenship or residency requirements for en-
listment in the armed forces to allow enlistment for noncitizens continu-
ously present since December 31, 2012, who were younger than fifteen 
on the date of initial entry, and who would be eligible for enlistment but 
for their unlawful status.220 These individuals would be adjusted to LPR 
status subject to automatic rescindment if discharged under other than 
honorable conditions before serving the term of enlistment.221 The 
ENLIST Act embodies an approach to modernizing the way that undoc-
umented people can earn citizenship through military service. This ap-
proach would aid stranded noncitizens in the military and even Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients who have no path to citizenship 
and may lose limited protections now that the program has been rescind-
ed.  
3. Deported Veterans and Other Institutional Reforms 
In light of the great sacrifice made, or pledged, by noncitizens in the 
military, stringent due process should be applied to their discharge and 
disqualification for military naturalizations. If the naturalization process 
is delayed or denied at either the U.S. Department of Defense or the 
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USCIS, the USCIS should reopen the affected military naturalization 
applications to investigate. In instances where the noncitizen was denied 
or abandoned because that person was unable to follow through on the 
U.S. Department of Defense naturalization process as a result of their 
military service, the USCIS should apply de novo, rather than deferen-
tial, review. Equitable principles associated with relief from deportation 
should be expanded. In instances where the noncitizen is ineligible due to 
subsequent substance abuse or criminal convictions, waivers from statu-
tory bars to deportation should be considered.222 Congress and the 
USCIS, in some cases, may strengthen the connection for noncitizens in 
the military to their asylum/refugee status, which may afford more ave-
nues to adjust status. 
In the most extreme cases, Congress should pass legislation to re-
patriate deported veterans.223 
CONCLUSION 
Citizenship is valuable for immigrants and for American society. 
The rights, benefits, and sense of belonging that accompany naturalized 
citizenship are important to protecting civil rights, voting rights, and due 
process rights for individuals. And the smooth operation of the processes 
permitting naturalized citizenship are important to protecting democratic 
values and regulatory institutions. 
Citizenship for service is specifically designed to recognize the 
uniquely valuable contributions of noncitizens who serve in the U.S. 
military. Often these service members are held up as model citizens be-
cause of their manifest displays of loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for 
the nation. Their official recognition and special dispensation by the fed-
eral government should not be diluted because of their immigration sta-
tus in an immigration restrictionist climate or pretextual national security 
concerns. Indeed, the special statutory provisions Congress designed to 
expedite service members’ naturalizations are meant to ensure strong and 
stable citizenship in times of national conflict. Relations between the 
citizens of warring nations might be tense, and U.S. affiliation might be 
vital to their daily existence. The ratcheting up of requirements for 
noncitizen soldiers undermines those promises. Indeed, it makes pos-
sessing foreign ties—the definition of an immigrant and the reason for 
recruitment—a matter for mistrust and mistreatment by the U.S. gov-
ernment. 
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Pulling back the lens, this Article describes the outcomes of policies 
disfavoring naturalization: worrisome slowdowns in naturalized citizen-
ship for all categories of immigrants and especially worrisome delays, 
denials, and declines in military naturalization. Through a detailed analy-
sis of possible causes, it suggests that the poor outcomes result from a 
combination of intentional policy goals and unintentional institutional 
neglect. Balancing concerns of fraud and national security with the goal 
of efficient and accurate processing is a challenge. Anti-immigrant sen-
timent directed toward noncitizens who have served the U.S. military is 
harder to justify given Congress’s history and purpose of citizenship for 
service and the U.S. Department of Defense’s reliance on foreign nation-
als to wage successful military campaigns. Inadvertent institutional bun-
gling and neglect of service members and veterans are equally intolerable 
and represent a failure of the normative ideal of earned citizenship and 
legislative mandates for the USCIS. 
The alarming deterioration of military naturalization indicates a 
need to reexamine the federal government’s messages about what it takes 
to make America great again. The policy episodes recounted in this Arti-
cle evince the tragic collision of President Trump’s anti-immigrant agen-
da with his demand for a stronger sense of patriotism and commitment to 
a national identity. While one policy agenda might be seen to comple-
ment the other in most cases, in the instance of noncitizens in the military 
the agendas conflict. The Trump Administration’s determination to pro-
tect the national borders from foreign threats by tolerating or forging 
blockages of military naturalization pits Americans against the very im-
migrants who are guarding the nation. The price is paid by noncitizen 
patriots in the name of national security but in a manner that, in reality, 
compromises national security. More generally, this cramped vision of 
what it takes to become American fails to recognize that immigrants are 
not perpetual foreigners whose national identity is fixed at birth. They 
can develop loyalty to a country other than the one of their birth by 
demonstrating certain qualifications. For that reason, they earn the rights 
of naturalized citizenship. What could be a normative ideal for citizen-
ship as a meaningful national identity instead becomes threatened by a 
false choice that keeps immigrants forever outside: between patriotism 
and national belonging. 
